Here’s a new one for you all.
Your Thread - May 12
May 12, 2008 · 438 Comments
Categories: Your threads
Tagged: drew peterson, Kathleen Savio, Stacy Peterson, your thread
Here’s a new one for you all.
Categories: Your threads
Tagged: drew peterson, Kathleen Savio, Stacy Peterson, your thread
438 responses so far ↓
58apache // May 12, 2008 at 5:54 am
Did you see/hear the quotes from Joel Brodsky regarding the Peterson investigation this weekend?
I find it highly ironic that he commented about the tax status of the search fund for Stacy Peterson. He was, in effect, questioning why the search fund committee had not filed for tax exempt status with the State’s Attorney General. One of the committee responded that they have filed for the exempt status but it takes time for approval.
Don’t you find it interesting that Joel Brodsky would be so concerned about tax status for a fund to FIND A MISSING PERSON? I do…
I also will reiterate my suspicions of a certain very small group of posters on this blog who are OBSESSED with donations to the fund and the tax status.
A personal message to Mr. Joel Brodsky and those who think like him: Any logical thinking person would question why you are so obsessed with a fund that is solely destined to support a grass-roots effort of concerned people around the world, that has one goal: TO FIND STACY PETERSON. I would think that you would fully support such an effort in an attempt to exonerate your client, the sole suspect, Drew Peterson.
Mr. Brodsky, to show ANY disgust with the search efforts just makes folks believe that you either have something to hide, or want the search efforts to fail.
The search efforts will not stop…
The search efforts will not fail…
And person who murdered Kathleen Savio and the person(s) responsible for the disappearance and possible homicide of Stacy Peterson will be held accountable.
58apache // May 12, 2008 at 6:02 am
I have a suggestion to the persons who are obsessed about the donations to the Find Stacy Peterson fund or the website findstacypeterson.com:
Starting today, don’t think of it as a fund to find Stacy. Rather, think of it as a gift to Thomas, Kristopher, Antony and Lacy Peterson. Think of it as a gift to them, where the end result is that their mother is found. One day they will be very grateful to everyone who searched for their mom.
I can assure you of one thing: Yesterday, Sunday, Mother’s Day, was probably not a very pleasant day for those kids. I wonder how desperately they wanted to hug their mom and tell her how much they love her. More than anything, I want them to know that their Mom would NEVER walk out on them, for all information in the media indicates that she adored them all and worked very hard to create a loving home.
chateauofdoubt // May 12, 2008 at 6:29 am
Does anyone know about the tax exempt status of the Defend Drew PayPal website?
feistygurl // May 12, 2008 at 6:35 am
well i for one want sp found. & i want to see the proof they have registered for tax exempt. I havent seen but maybe 2 searches since spring for this woman. i have seen then ask to hit the donate. & if ya question it they say you will go to hell. & why would they pay for a blogger to come from ca to attend a fun raiser? that trully baffels me. I feel for them children everyday & cant imagine what their summer is gonna be like with the shrine next door. i meant what i said i would haunt someone who did this to my children & i would haunt their father also
chateauofdoubt // May 12, 2008 at 6:35 am
Does anyone know how long it took Joel Brodsky to file his papers? I cannot find Defend Drew Peterson listed on any charitable organization websites.
Since he is an attorney, and he is making claims in public, I would guess his paper work would be in order.
If not, I would suggest that people make inquiries about Joel Brodsky to this website:
http://www.iardc.org/htr_filingarequest.html
chateauofdoubt // May 12, 2008 at 6:37 am
Drew said the older childen are bored of the story so I doubt it bothers them and as far as the younger children, they cannot read and all it is is flowers with pictures of their mom.
Has Drew taken down all the pictures of Stacy in his home?
chateauofdoubt // May 12, 2008 at 6:39 am
http://www.iardc.org/htr_filingarequest.html
I cannot find anywhere that states Defend Drew is a charitable organization. Can someone please check?
If they are not, the link above may be a good place to start a complaint about an attorney who does not practice what he preaches.
amandareckonwith // May 12, 2008 at 6:40 am
I want what you’re smoking 58apache. Wait, on second thought maybe not. I’d rather be able to hear the truth about the fund.
VERY glad a reporter had the guts to ask the elephant question.
They are not searching, if you hadn’t heard. They are fun-raising.
Where/how are the funds spent?
How much is in the fund?
How much $$ in donations to date?
Why have they not registered with the IRS, the IL SAG, the IL SOS, why are they not listed on legit fundraiser sites?
Last, who is allowed to have a cookie?
I am wondering (because of the shady dealings) who’s hand is in the cookie jar.
**IF** it is all above suspicion, it would be easy to disclose and account for every penny. If not, we hear nothing.
It’s not like she disappeared a week or two ago. It does not take 6 months to get tax-exempt status, nor to register with legit agencys. Following the law. Or, could illegal activities be happening? Just wondering.
chateauofdoubt // May 12, 2008 at 6:42 am
I agree that the same inquiries should be posed to the Defend Drew PayPal website.
facsmiley // May 12, 2008 at 6:43 am
I think I’m reading last week’s thread. Anyone care if I just copy and paste my replies from then?
facsmiley // May 12, 2008 at 6:44 am
facsmiley, on May 7th, 2008 at 12:57 pm Said:
Here’s the thing that puzzles me regarding suspicions about the search donations. You would think that if there were any actual problems that complaints would be coming from the big-time donors like Advantage Chevrolet, who has donated over a thousand dollars.
But they were quoted in the press today, and they didn’t express any concerns with the status of the foundation, or the use of funds. They were just happy to donate.
In March, the foundation received $10,000 to go towards the reward fund. If there was something underhand going on, wouldn’t that donor be speaking out? But they aren’t.
Now, do you see why this starts to sound like to some like ‘white noise’? If this problem doesn’t appear to exist for the people who have the most to lose, then it looks more and more like just another non-story detracting from the real issue of a missing woman and the man suspected of making her disappear.
feistygurl // May 12, 2008 at 6:45 am
& you believe what dp says? i dont. of course those children are hurting. & a big difference in a few pics around the house than a shrine next door that all about getting dp to crack. its not sharons job its the LE’s. So if you went missing & were presumed dead chateu would you want it in your kids face 24 7. to me that is beyond selfish it borders on child abuse. & of course their father is probably the cause of it. still doesnt make it right on sharons part. its not about who can be more wrong
feistygurl // May 12, 2008 at 6:47 am
well the 1k was just donated & wasnt the 10k donated to keep cass off the selling block
chateauofdoubt // May 12, 2008 at 6:47 am
www . IARDC . org
What Is the ARDC?
As our name implies, the ARDC is the agency of the Supreme Court of Illinois which registers attorneys and investigates complaints of misconduct filed against attorneys holding a license to practice law in Illinois.
Our principal purpose is to assist the Supreme Court to determine a lawyer’s fitness to practice law in Illinois. If a complaint is made that an attorney, licensed to practice law in Illinois, has engaged in illegal, unethical or dishonest conduct, we will investigate and, if warranted, bring formal disciplinary charges. The Supreme Court of Illinois will then ultimately decide if a lawyer should be censured (publicly rebuked), suspended (having the law license to practice either taken away for a certain period of time or placed on a probationary period) or disbarred (having the law license taken away indefinitely).
We cannot impose fines, imprison, obtain monetary damages, enforce remedies between the lawyer and client, or seek civil or criminal relief against a lawyer as part of the disciplinary process. We can affect only the lawyer’s ability to practice law in Illinois.
We are not funded by taxpayers’ money. We are funded entirely by the annual registration fees paid by attorneys authorized to practice law in Illinois.
What Is a Request for an Investigation of an Attorney?
It is a request to us that we look into the conduct of an attorney who you believe has acted improperly. We will review your request to determine if an investigation is warranted. In most cases, we will initiate an investigation where the information you provide us suggests that the attorney engaged in illegal, dishonest or unethical conduct. Filing a request accusing an attorney of unethical conduct is a serious matter to the lawyer. We recommend that, whenever practical, you try to resolve any differences or disputes that do not concern claims of unethical conduct directly with the lawyer.
How Do I Request an Investigation of an Attorney?
By mailing to our office, either in Chicago or Springfield, a request that you want an attorney to be investigated by our office. Your request should be in writing. No special form is necessary. For your convenience, you may download a Request for Investigation form. Please return the Request by postal mail or hand-delivery. The ARDC does not accept an e-mail transmission of a Request for Investigation.
What Kinds of Information Should I Put in My Request for an Investigation?
A request should include all important information that relates to your request. If possible, it should be typewritten or printed to be sure that it is legible. The request should include:
Your name, address and telephone number, and the name, address and telephone number of the attorney whom you want us to investigate (include the lawyer’s full name, as well as the law firm name);
Any court case names and numbers;
A description of what the lawyer did or did not do that may have been improper; and
Any supporting documents that you have, such as letters, agreements, or other documents involved.
If I Have Any Questions About Filing My Request, Can I Talk to Someone at the ARDC?
Yes. If you have questions that are not answered here, you may call us or come into either our Chicago or Springfield office to speak with a Commission representative.
Is There a Fee or Cost for a Request for an Investigation?
No. There is no fee or cost to you.
Where Should I Send My Request for an Investigation?
If the office of the lawyer involved is in northern Illinois, please send the request to our Chicago office. In central or southern Illinois, we ask that you send the request to our Springfield office.
How is a Request Processed?
Upon receipt of your request, your inquiry will be given a file number and assigned to a Commission lawyer who will review your request and decide whether there is a basis for us to investigate.
How Long Will It Take Before I Hear Something?
We will notify you in writing of our decision whether to investigate about two weeks after we received your request. If we determine that there is not a sufficient basis for us to investigate, our letter to you will explain the reasons for our decision. If you have any questions about your request, we ask that you direct your questions to the Commission lawyer who handled your request and that you refer to your file number.
If the ARDC Decides to Investigate, What Will Happen Next?
If we decide to investigate, our investigation generally includes sending a copy of the information that you provided to the lawyer being investigated. We will ask the lawyer to respond. Typically, the lawyer will send us his response about two to four weeks thereafter. If we determine it necessary, we will mail a copy of the lawyer’s response to you for your comment. Our investigation may also include obtaining information from other sources.
After we have obtained the pertinent facts, Commission counsel will determine if further action is warranted. If we decide that no further action is warranted, we will send you a letter explaining the reasons for our decision. How long it will take before a determination is made varies greatly. Much depends on the complexity of the issues, the amount of information and documents we must review, and whether the lawyer or other sources are cooperating with our request for information. A determination will be made after we have obtained all of the pertinent information from the lawyer and/or other sources and you will be notified of our decision.
Will I Be Notified if the ARDC Decides to Take Disciplinary Action?
If we determine that disciplinary action is warranted, we will refer the investigation to the Inquiry Board. The Inquiry Board acts in panels of three persons, two lawyers and one non-lawyer. The Board reviews the investigation and decides whether to authorize us to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the lawyer. We will notify you of the reference to the Inquiry Board and of the Board’s ultimate decision.
Can I Withdraw My Request for an Investigation?
You may tell us at anytime that you are satisfied with the action which the lawyer has taken to resolve your concerns. We will review that information along with the rest of the investigation in deciding whether to take further action. We note that it would be inappropriate for the lawyer to enter an agreement with you which would require you to withdraw your request or refuse to cooperate with the Commission investigation.
I think if Defend Drew PayPal Website was not properly set up by an attorney who should know better and who is throwing accusations around in public, he should be investigated.
chateauofdoubt // May 12, 2008 at 6:50 am
I would hope if one of my family members were missing under such suspicious circumstances that I would have a neighbor like Sharon.
feistygurl // May 12, 2008 at 6:52 am
why in the world would you want dp to have a good lawyer.? I would want him to have the dumbest lawyer out there.
chateauofdoubt // May 12, 2008 at 6:54 am
DECISION FROM DISCIPLINARY REPORTS AND DECISIONS SEARCH
Filed February 15, 2002
BEFORE THE HEARING BOARD
OF THE
ILLINOIS ATTORNEY REGISTRATION
AND
DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION
In the matter of:
JOEL ALAN BRODSKY,
Attorney-Respondent,
No. 6182556
Commission No. 01 CH 42
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE HEARING BOARD
The hearing in this matter was held on November 14, 2001 at the offices of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission, Chicago, Illinois. Hearing panel members James A. Shapiro and Leonard J. Schrager were present. In the absence of the non-lawyer member of the panel, the parties stipulated to having the case heard and determined by a two-member panel. Sarah R. Masarachia represented the Administrator of the ARDC and Respondent was represented by Stuart P. Krauskopf.
COMPLAINT AND ANSWER
On May 8, 2001 the Administrator filed a one-count complaint against Respondent Joel Alan Brodsky alleging that he forged a signature on bank forms in order to withdraw client funds from the bank, falsely endorsed a cashier’s check issued by the bank, failed to deposit the proceeds in a separate identifiable trust account and kept the funds for his own purposes. He was charged with the following misconduct:
conversion;
failure to deposit and maintain client funds in a separate identifiable trust account in violation of Rule 1.15(a) and 1.15(d) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct;
committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer by committing the
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crime of forgery in violation of 720 ILCS 5/17-3 in violation of Rule 8.4(a)(3);
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in violation of Rule 8.4(a)(4);
conduct which tends to defeat the administration of justice or bring the courts or legal profession into disrepute in violation of Supreme Court Rule 771.
In his answer to the complaint, Respondent admitted signing another person’s name to bank forms and to a check but affirmatively stated that he believed his actions were necessary to protect and preserve the proceeds of an estate. He further admitted that he failed to deposit client money into a separate and identifiable trust fund account but maintained that he did keep the money separate from other client accounts and did not commingle the money. Respondent denied keeping any money for his own purposes and denied each charge of misconduct.
EVIDENCE
The Administrator called two witnesses, including Respondent, in support of her case and introduced 17 exhibits. Respondent testified on his own behalf, presented several character witnesses and tendered 12 exhibits.
The admitted allegations of the complaint and the evidence submitted at hearing established that Respondent is currently a sole practitioner who was licensed to practice law in Illinois in 1982. His practice focuses on criminal defense work, complex commercial and civil litigation, domestic relations and bankruptcy. From January 1989 to April 1997 he was a partner with Bahtiar Hoxha in the law firm of Brodsky & Hoxha. During the partnership, Hoxha handled the estate and probate matters, including the Estate of Charroon Shotivattana, deceased. Respondent never handled an estate matter and admitted to having very limited knowledge of probate matters. (Tr. 53-54, 113).
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The administrator of the Shotivattana Estate was Herbert Shoichi Tomita. On March 1, 1990 Mr. Tomita opened an account with Bank Leumi under the name “Estate of Charroon Shotivattana, Herbert Shoichi Tomita, Administrators.” Mr. Tomita was the sole signator on the account. The address on the account was listed as “c/o Brodsky & Hoxha Atty at Law, 180 N. LaSalle St, Ste 620, Chicago, Illinois 60601.” Mr. Tomita died on April 13, 1995. (Admin. Ex. 2, 3, 11, 15).
In 1997 the partnership of Brodsky & Hoxha dissolved and Hoxha took all of the probate matters, including the Shotivattana estate matter, with him to his new practice. After the dissolution of the partnership, Respondent and Hoxha were not on speaking terms even though their law practices were located in the same building at 180 N. LaSalle Street, Chicago, Illinois. (Tr. 54-55, 78).
On or about July 19, 2000, Respondent received a letter from Bank Leumi regarding the Shotivattana account. The letter, addressed to Herbert Tomita “c/o Brodsky & Hoxha Atty at Law 180 N LaSalle St. Ste. 620,” stated that the account had been inactive since January 6, 1995 and as of June 30, 2000 the account was reclassified as dormant and therefore subject to additional monthly service charges. The letter went on to state that the account could be restored to active status by making a deposit or by signing the reactivation request at the bottom of the letter. (Admin. Ex. 5; Tr. 55).
Victor Zezelic, Jr., a banking officer at Bank Leumi, U.S.A., explained the consequences associated with an inactive account. He stated that after an account has been inactive for five years, the bank sends a standard letter to the account holder informing that person of the inactivity in the account and the imposition of monthly service charges to dormant accounts. The letter further states that the account holder may restore the account to active status by making a deposit or signing a request for reactivation. Although not stated in the letter,
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Zezelic testified that the deposit can be as little as one dollar and that a withdrawal of funds would also reactivate the account. If the bank receives no response to the letter, the funds in the account are turned over to the State. Zezelic confirmed that on July 11, 2000 such a letter was sent to Herbert Tomita, the Administrator of the Estate of Charroon Shotivattana, in care of the law firm of Brodsky & Hoxha. (Tr. 22-26).
Respondent did not attempt to contact his former partner, Bahtiar Hoxha, regarding the letter he received from Bank Leumi. Respondent stated that he was irritated that Hoxha had neglected the Shotivattana estate for five years and he had lost confidence in Hoxha’s ability to finish the work. He recalled that years earlier Tomita had complained to him that Hoxha had canceled twelve appointments to discuss the estate file. (Tr. 69, 78-80).
Respondent signed his own name to the request to reactivate the Shotivattana estate account and took the form to Bank Leumi on or about July 19, 2000. The request was rejected because Respondent was not a signator on the account. Respondent stated that the alternative method of reactivating the account, by making a deposit to the account, did not occur to him. After the request form was rejected, Respondent went directly to the courthouse to check the activity in the probate court file for the Shotivattana estate. He discovered that in the early 1990’s several claims against the estate had been approved by the court but no orders had been entered for at least five years. (Ad. Ex. 6, Resp. Ex. 3; Tr. 55-56, 83-87).
Respondent testified that he signed Herbert Tomita’s name to a second reactivation form, took the form to Bank Leumi and gave it to Victor Zezelic. Zezelic confirmed that he received a form bearing the purported signature of Herbert Tomita and that after the signature was compared to the signator card and approved by a senior bank officer, the estate account was reactivated. (Ad. Ex. 7; Tr. 28-29, 58).
At or about the time Respondent submitted the reactivation request, he also
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requested that the estate account be closed. A third reactivation form bears the signature of Herbert Tomita and contains the additional handwritten notation “Please close account. /s/ Herbert Tomita 07/20/00.” The testimony conflicted as to when this added notation was made. Zezelic testified that Respondent approached him on July 20, 2000 with the request that the estate account be closed. When Zezelic told Respondent that the bank needed a signed request with Tomita’s signature, Respondent then returned on July 21 with the request purportedly signed by Tomita. Respondent recalled, however, that several days or a week after the account was closed Zezelic realized that he needed a complete record and asked Respondent to have Tomita add the notation to the form. (Admin. Ex. 8; Tr. 29-30, 38, 60-62).
Zezelic testified that, when Respondent returned with the request signed by Tomita, he asked Respondent why Tomita was not present. Respondent told him that Tomita was “incapacitated.” Zezelic did not inquire into the nature of the incapacitation but recalled that Respondent used that particular word to describe Tomita’s absence. Zezelic admitted that he typically has as many as 24 conversations with bank customers each day but was able to recall his conversation with Respondent because they went into the anteroom of the bank. Zezelic stated that he relied upon Respondent’s statement concerning Tomita because Respondent is an attorney and because he had dealt with Respondent for one year. (Ad. Ex. 8; Tr. 30, 34, 42, 50). Respondent testified that he had no recollection of telling Zezelic that Tomita was incapacitated. (Tr. 146-47).
Respondent testified that he believed he had authority to sign Tomita’s name to the reactivation form as well as to the request to close the account because he was listed as one of the attorneys of record for the estate in the probate court file. He admitted that he did not have a court order nor did he have authority from his former partner or from Tomita to request that the bank distribute the proceeds of the account. He further admitted that when he signed Tomita’s
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name, he purposefully tried to make the signature look like Tomita’s signature so that the bank would believe it was authentic and release the funds. (Tr. 58-59, 63-64, 81, 137).
On or about Monday, July 23, 2000 Bank Leumi closed the estate account and issued a cashier’s check in the amount of $23,012.91 to be paid to the order of “Herbert S. Tomita Adm. of the Est. of C. Shotivattana.” Respondent testified that he picked up the check from Bank Leumi and, before cashing it, attempted to locate Tomita. His efforts included conducting an internet people search, checking the computerized partnership files and client index cards and reviewing the archived word processing documents for the estate file. Having no success, he affixed Tomita’s endorsement to the back of the check and tendered it to a close friend, Mike Abusaad, who gave Respondent $23,013 in cash. Respondent again stated that he believed he had the authority to sign his client’s name to the check to protect the funds. He admitted, however, that he has since learned that his belief was incorrect. (Admin. Ex. 9, 10; Tr. 31, 64-67, 88-89, 98-99).
After receiving the cash, Respondent inserted the money into an envelope marked with Tomita’s name and placed the envelope in a safe in his home in Wilmette, Illinois. Respondent did not tell anyone else about the funds in the safe. (Tr. 68, 102).
Respondent stated that he closed the Shotivattana estate account in order to protect the funds from forfeiture to the State of Illinois and to protect himself from any malpractice action. He recalled that after his initial conversation with Zezelic on July 19, he had the impression that the funds were at risk of being forfeited in a short period of time. Zezelic testified, however, that he never told Respondent that the funds in the estate account were in danger of being forfeited to the State. Respondent denied knowing that the State would have held the funds in trust until the rightful owners came forward and denied knowing about the Illinois Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, 765 ILCS 1025. (Tr. 32, 74, 82, 99,
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141).
As for keeping the funds in cash rather than depositing the money in a bank, Respondent explained that he could not open an account in Tomita’s name without Tomita’s signature and he could not place the funds in an account in his own name because that action would amount to commingling. Further, he believed he could not put the funds in his client trust account because probate money cannot be commingled with other client accounts. (Tr. 91, 101-02, 138-41).
Respondent testified that, after he placed the estate funds in his safe, he intended to contact a competent probate attorney who could finish the work on the estate. He did not have a chance to contact an attorney or conduct any research regarding the proper handling of the funds, however, because during the time period between July and November 2000 he was occupied with several criminal trials and a week-long commercial trial. He believed that as long as the funds were secure in his safe, the situation was not urgent. (Tr. 68-73, 95-97, 100).
Respondent stated that on November 1, 2000 he received a letter from his former partner informing him that Herbert Tomita was deceased and asking him what he intended to do regarding the administration of the Shotivattana estate. Prior to his receipt of the letter, Respondent had no knowledge that Tomita had died. The letter from Hoxha further stated “I assume that you [withdrew the estate funds] to prevent the assets from going to the State of Illinois because the account has been dormant for sometime, and that said funds are currently in your client’s funds account.” Respondent replied, by letter of November 1, 2000, that he intended to handle the estate matter and requested that Hoxha forward any documents regarding the matter. (Admin. Ex. 12, 13; Tr. 75, 79).
Zezelic testified that in November, 2000 he also received a letter from Hoxha’s office informing him that Tomita was deceased at the time the bank issued a check for the
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proceeds of the Shotivattana estate account. In light of the improper endorsement of Tomita’s name on the check, Hoxha demanded that the bank immediately replenish the funds to the estate account. Upon receipt of the letter, Zezelic contacted Respondent and requested that the funds be returned. The following morning, Respondent appeared at the bank with the full amount of cash to redeposit into the estate account. Although Respondent stated that he returned the full amount in the exact same $100 bills he had received when he cashed the check, Zezelic testified that, from his vantage point at another teller window, he saw that Respondent had deposited $20 bills. Zezelic further stated that to his knowledge Respondent did not return the funds with interest even though the estate account was an interest bearing account. Respondent denied spending any of the estate money. (Ad. Ex. 14; Tr. 32-33; 92-93, 143-44, 149).
Respondent expressed his regret that he did not act differently with regard to the Shotivattana account and admitted that he was guilty of bad decision-making. He apologized for any damage done to the legal profession. (Tr. 133-35).
Evidence was submitted concerning Respondent’s financial situation during the time period prior to November, 2000. Respondent testified that his 1997 divorce strained his financial situation and approximately one year after the divorce he filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Although his debts were discharged in bankruptcy, Respondent has paid some of those debts and intends to pay the remainder as well. He stated that his financial status has improved, he has a good credit rating and his checking account was never overdrawn during the time period involved in this matter. He pays all of his bills on time, including the mortgage on his home and child support for his two children. During the summer and fall of 2000, his investment account had a balance of between $10,000 and $14,000. Respondent stated that his law practice was in good financial condition throughout 2000 and there were no shortfalls or overdrafts in his client trust account. He estimated that his gross
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revenue for fiscal 2000 was $175,000. (Resp. Ex. 6-11; Tr. 107-21).
Respondent has made charitable contributions to various organizations, including his synagogue and the Hebrew Theological College. He attends regular services and study groups at his synagogue. (Resp. Ex. 13; Tr. 122-24).
Respondent’s pro bono endeavors have included bankruptcy work for a disabled attorney, criminal defense work and an immigration case in which a Chicago mother was reunited with her child from Romania. He has worked with the clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County on the relocation of the traffic court and on establishing a system for reporting felony DUI’s to the Secretary of State’s office. He co-chaired a committee that reviewed the status of the civil division of the circuit court and made recommendations for improvements to the division. (Tr. 125-131).
Several witnesses, including a judge and a Chicago police officer, testified to Respondent’s upstanding reputation for truthfulness and veracity. Two additional witnesses discussed work that Respondent had done for them on a pro bono basis. Donald Utrosa believed that Respondent was single-handedly responsible for bringing his wife’s son to the United States from Romania. Robert Kleinberg credited Respondent with negotiating a reduced sentence for Kleinberg’s son in a substance abuse matter and with providing continuous support and assistance to the Kleinberg family.
Victor Zezelic testified that Respondent had a good relationship with Bank Leumi and that Respondent had just made a mistake. Zezelic believed that Respondent should be shown some leniency. He admitted that he had not discussed Respondent’s reputation for truth, veracity or honesty with anyone in the legal community. (Tr. 50-51).
A final witness, Judge Melvin Cole, was called as a character witness on behalf of Respondent. Upon examination, Judge Cole acknowledged that he had not spoken to anyone
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regarding Respondent’s reputation in the legal community and any opinion as to Respondent’s reputation would be based solely on his own personal experience and observance. Judge Cole did state that he had referred two matters to Respondent and he did speak to those clients and knew their opinion of the quality of Respondent’s work. The Administrator objected to any testimony concerning Respondent’s performance in other cases, arguing that such testimony is inadmissible. The hearing panel took the objection under advisement.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Respondent was charged with conversion of client funds; failing to deposit and maintain client funds in a separate identifiable trust account; committing a criminal act (forgery) that reflects adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer; engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; and engaging in conduct which tends to defeat the administration of justice or bring the courts or legal profession into disrepute. In attorney disciplinary proceedings the Administrator has the burden of proving the charges of misconduct by clear and convincing evidence. See In re Ingersoll, 186 Ill. 2d 163, 710 N.E.2d 390, 393 (1999). Clear and convincing evidence constitutes a high level of certainty, which is greater than a preponderance of the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Williams, 143 Ill. 2d 477, 577 N.E.2d 762, 765 (1991).
We find, based upon the admitted allegations of the complaint and the evidence adduced at hearing, that the Administrator proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent converted funds belonging to the Estate of Charroon Shotivattana. Respondent’s assertion that he did not “use” the funds and simply kept them in his home safe does not preclude our finding. Conversion has been defined by the Supreme Court as “any unauthorized act, which deprives a man of his property permanently or for an indefinite time.” In re Rosin, 156 Ill. 2d 202, 620 N.E.2d 368, 370 (1993). Conversion may occur in numerous ways and does not require a
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dishonest motive. See In re Timpone, 157 Ill. 2d 178, 623 N.E.2d 300, 309 (1993). When an attorney holds money for another, it is essential that it be held in “such a manner that there can be no doubt that the attorney is holding it only for another and that the money does not belong to him personally.” See In re Clayter, 78 Ill. 2d 276, 399 N.E.2d 1318, 1321 (1980).
During the time Respondent held the funds in his home, without the knowledge or consent of any representative of the estate, the estate was deprived of the use of those funds. Moreover, the funds were in jeopardy of being lost to the estate in the event of Respondent’s death because he did not maintain adequate documentation of the ownership of the funds nor did he provide any record of his transaction to the estate file, to his former partner or to the bank. In essence, funds that belonged to the client were turned into funds to which Respondent had sole access and which he could use freely without the client’s knowledge or approval. This is conversion of funds.
The Administrator referred us to cases in which the Court rejected claims that client funds were protected where those funds were kept in the form of cash and locked up for safekeeping. In In re Ashbach, 13 Ill. 2d 411, 150 N.E.2d 119, 123 (1958), the attorney cashed the settlement checks of three clients and retained the proceeds in a filing cabinet. In finding that the attorney engaged in conversion the Court stated: “[t]he claim of respondent that he segregated the proceeds of these settlements in cash in a steel filing cabinet, and made disbursements therefrom without any written record or account, an assertion which is common under such circumstances (citation omitted), taxes our credulity.” Ashbach, 150 N.E.2d at 123.
In In re Simpson, 41 Ill. 2d 562, 268 N.E.2d 20, 22 (1971), the Court stated that even if the attorney’s account of safekeeping his client’s funds in a safe without a receipt or record was accepted at face value, the “slip-shod” safekeeping, coupled with the attorney’s failure to return the client’s money on request and his retention of the money until after
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disciplinary hearings began, was “tantamount to a designed fraudulent conversion.” Simpson, 268 N.E.2d at 22. See also In re Wallis, 96 SH 589 (1998), M.R. 15549 (1999) (case dismissed upon death of Respondent) (Hearing Board and Review Board found that conversion occurred when attorney held client funds, in the form of a cashier’s check and currency, in a locked office). We adhere to the reasoning cited in the foregoing cases and reject any notion that keeping client funds in a locked safe is a defense to a charge of conversion.
We also find that the Administrator established by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent failed to deposit and maintain client funds in a separate identifiable trust account in violation of Rules 1.15(a) and 1.15(d) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct. Respondent’s own admissions that he kept the Shotivattana estate funds in the form of cash in his home establish a clear failure to comply with Rule 1.15. The fact that the funds were not commingled with his own or any other funds does not preclude a finding that the rule was violated.
In In re Johnson, 133 Ill. 2d 516, 552 N.E.2d 703 (1989) the Court was confronted with an attorney who also served as consul general for the Republic of Iceland. The attorney deposited client settlement funds into a consular account in order to protect the funds from his client’s creditors. The Court rejected the attorney’s argument that the “separate identifiable” provision of the rule was satisfied and noted that while there was no evidence of a technical commingling, the rule is intended to “guard not only against the actual loss of the funds but also against the risk of loss.” Johnson, 552 N.E.2d at 710. The Court pointed out that failure to comply with the express mandate of the rule often leads to the commingling of client funds which, in turn, often leads to the conversion of the client funds to the attorney’s personal use or benefit. See Johnson, 552 N.E.2d at 710.
In In re Lingle, 27 Ill. 2d 459, 189 N.E.2d 342, 344 (1963) the attorney cashed a
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settlement check and, after withdrawing his fees and expenses, placed the balance of the funds in an envelope which he marked and put into his safety deposit box. When he eventually removed the cash from the safety deposit box, he did not save the marked envelope. The Court described the attorney’s actions as “a covert method of handling a client’s funds” which was “highly unprofessional and one which can only create suspicion and harmful inference.” Lingle, 189 N.E.2d at 344.
We further find that Respondent’s acts of conversion and failure to deposit client funds into a separate identifiable account have brought the legal profession into disrepute in violation of Supreme Court Rule 771. See In re Lingle, 189 N.E.2d at 346 (”The loose, careless and dilatory practices followed by respondent in matters entrusted to him, his failure to follow court orders, and his unorthodox methods of handling and accounting for funds entrusted to him, all were such as to bring the legal profession, the courts and the administration of justice into disrepute”); In re Lewis, 118 Ill. 2d 357, 515 N.E.2d 96, 98 (1987) (commingling and conversion places the entire legal profession in disrepute).
As to the remaining charges set forth in the complaint, we find that the Administrator did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent committed the criminal act of forgery as that offense is set forth in the Illinois Criminal Code, 720 ILCS 5/17-3. The Code defines forgery as follows:
Forgery. (a) A person commits forgery when, with intent to defraud, he knowingly:
(1) Makes or alters any document apparently capable of defrauding another in such manner that it purports to have been made by another or at another time, or with different provisions, or by authority of one who did not give such authority; or
(2) Issues or delivers such document knowing it to have been thus made or altered; or
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(3) Possesses, with intent to issue or deliver, any such document knowing it to have been thus made or altered.
A key element of forgery, an “intent to defraud,” is the element we find to be missing in the present case. Respondent admitted that he signed Tomita’s name on three separate occasions — twice on bank forms and once as an endorsement to the cashier’s check made payable to Tomita. His testimony reveals, however, (and we believe his statements) that his intent in signing another person’s name was not to defraud the bank or his client. He repeatedly stated that he was worried about the imminent forfeiture of the funds to the State and wanted to act quickly to protect those funds on behalf of his client. Moreover, he believed that as an attorney of record for the Shotivattana estate, he had the authority to sign Tomita’s name to release the estate funds. His actions, as he came to learn at a later time, were fraught with mistaken assumptions. While we clearly do not excuse Respondent for his failure to investigate his authority to sign another person’s name or his lack of thoroughness in researching the law applicable to dormant accounts, his misguided actions and lack of research alone are not sufficient to establish an intent to defraud. Nor can we infer a fraudulent intent from any other conduct or circumstances. See In re Stern, 124 Ill. 2d 310, 529 N.E.2d 562, 565 (198
(motive and intent are rarely proved by direct evidence and must be inferred from conduct and circumstances.) Here, the Administrator offered no proof that Respondent actually spent any of the estate funds, that he had a plan for the funds, that he was in dire financial straits, or that he attempted to cover his tracks to avoid any detection.
The conflicting testimony concerning the denomination of the bills returned by Respondent does not disturb us. Although Mr. Zezelic recalled seeing Respondent deposit $20 bills, he admitted that he viewed the transaction from a distance. While we have no reason to doubt the trustworthiness of Zezelic, we recognize that the likelihood of his being able to clearly
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recollect and distinguish Respondent’s transaction from the dozens of others he probably witnessed during that day is marginal. Respondent, on the other hand, described the type of bills he received from his friend Abusaad and testified convincingly that he redeposited the exact same bills to the estate account.
The testimony that does trouble us is Respondent’s admission that he purposely attempted to sign Tomita’s name so as to replicate Tomita’s actual signature. If Respondent sincerely believed he had authority to sign Tomita’s name, there would be no reason for such a subterfuge. Having observed Respondent, however, and listened to his explanations and concerns over the funds, we believe that his purposeful attempt to mimic Tomita’s signature was predicated upon his belief that time was of the essence in securing the funds from forfeiture to the State. He apparently sincerely believed that his action was necessary to quickly protect his client’s funds. In light of our observations and conclusions regarding Respondent’s testimony and demeanor, we find that Respondent did not possess the requisite intent to commit forgery and therefore did not violate Rule 8.4(a)(3).
For similar reasons we find that Respondent did not engage in dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in violation of Rule 8.4(a)(4). We believe that the element of intent is inherent in that rule and that the Administrator did not prove that Respondent acted with the necessary intent to deceive anyone. Rather, Respondent’s greatest mistake was acting in haste without seeking appropriate information or advice. His decision-making was further clouded by the ill will that existed between himself and his former partner.
In In re Howard, 96 CH 531 (Rev. Bd. 1998), appr’d M.R. 15103 (1998), an attorney who signed the names of hospital employees on birth history forms without the authorization of those employees was charged with engaging in dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in violation of Rule 8.4(a)(4). The Review Board expressed some doubt as to
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whether “the purpose of Rule 8.4(a)(4) was intended to cover situations where an attorney’s questionable completion of a form may have been simply the result of a misunderstanding on her part”. Howard, Rev. Bd. Rpt. at 15. After noting that the attorney should have been cognizant of the impression she gave to anyone who might read the form, the Board stated that “without any evidence of dishonest intent, however, we view any misrepresentation as simply an exercise in poor judgment and, at most, a technical violation of the rule.” Howard, Rev. Bd. Rpt. at 15. See also In re Johnson, 133 Ill. 2d 516, 552 N.E.2d 703, 709 (1989) (attorney who signed co-counsel’s name to check did not engage in dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation with respect to his co-counsel where attorney’s purpose was to quickly deposit settlement check); In re Witt, 145 Ill. 2d 380, 583 N.E.2d 526, 534 (1991) (no violation of Rule 1-102(a)(4) (predecessor to Rule 8.4(a)(4)) where judge failed to disclose loan on “Declaration of Economic Interest” but had no intent to deceive).
RECOMMENDATION
Having concluded that Respondent engaged in wrongdoing, we must determine the appropriate discipline warranted by the misconduct. In determining the proper sanction, we consider the purposes of the disciplinary process. The goal of these proceedings is not to punish but rather to safeguard the public, maintain the integrity of the profession, and protect the administration of justice from reproach. See In re Timpone, 157 Ill. 2d 178, 623 N.E.2d 300, 309 (1993). Another factor for consideration is the deterrent value of attorney discipline and the need to impress upon others the repercussions of errors such as those committed by Respondent in the present case. See In re Discipio, 163 Ill. 2d 515, 645 N.E.2d 906, 912 (1995).
We also take into account those circumstances which may mitigate and/or aggravate the misconduct. See In re Witt, 145 Ill. 2d 380, 583 N.E.2d 526, 535 (1991). In mitigation, the evidence established that Respondent has acknowledged his wrongdoing,
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expressed remorse for his actions and cooperated in these proceedings. Further, the evidence did not indicate that Respondent’s actions resulted from any dishonest or pecuniary motive and there are no prior orders or opinions imposing discipline upon Respondent. See In re Clayter, 78 Ill. 2d 276, 399 N.E.2d 1318, 1321 (1980); In re Samuels, 126 Ill. 2d 509, 535 N.E.2d 808, 816 (1989).
We note that Respondent returned the estate funds to Bank Leumi promptly upon request and before any complaint was filed in this matter. Restitution, while not a defense to charges of misconduct, can be taken into consideration as a factor in mitigation. See In re Rolley, 121 Ill. 2d 222, 520 N.E.2d 302, 307 (1988).
We also consider Respondent’s charitable and pro bono activities as well as his reputation for truth and veracity. We decline to give any weight to the testimony of Judge Cole, however, since his opinion of Respondent’s reputation in the legal community was confined to knowledge of Respondent’s reputation for competence rather than to his reputation for truth and veracity. Judge Cole’s knowledge of Respondent’s performance on other cases is not relevant to our determination of discipline in this case. See In re Samuels, 126 Ill. 2d 509, 535 N.E.2d 808, 816 (1989) (Court refused to consider question of whether respondent’s other clients were well-served).
In aggravation, we consider Respondent’s disturbing failure to adequately research various issues relevant to his actions in this case. Had he investigated the repercussions of leaving the funds in the estate account, researched his authority to sign Tomita’s name, contacted his former partner when he received the initial letter from the bank, or consulted any competent probate attorney for advice, he may have avoided a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and eliminated the necessity for the present proceeding.
Further, we consider in aggravation the fact that Respondent’s conduct caused a
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serious risk of harm to his client. During the three months that the estate’s $23,000 sat in Respondent’s home safe with no written record of its whereabouts, the funds were at risk of being lost to the estate. The death or disability of Respondent, coupled with the continued failure by estate heirs or creditors to pursue their claims, could have caused the funds to be mistaken for property belonging to Respondent. See In re Saladino, 71 Ill. 2d 263, 375 N.E.2d 102, 107 (197
(discipline should be “closely linked to the harm caused or the unreasonable risk created by the [attorney's] lack of care”).
The Administrator, assuming that we would find all of the charges in the complaint proved, suggested that we recommend a suspension of three years or, in the alternative, a suspension of three years until further order of court. Respondent proposed a censure.
Because we have found that significant charges of the complaint were not proved by clear and convincing evidence, we reject the Administrator’s suggestion, and the cases she offered in support of that suggestion, as being too harsh. We look for guidance instead to those cases involving a single instance of conversion involving no dishonest motive. We also keep in mind the aggravating circumstances present in this case.
Discipline imposed in conversion cases involving a first offense with no dishonest motive has ranged from censure to short suspensions. See In re Young, 111 Ill. 2d 98, 488 N.E.2d 1014, 1017 (1986) (attorney censured for holding $3,209.04 of escrow funds in his personal account, the balance of which several times dropped below the amount being held in escrow and at one point was overdrawn); In re McLennon, 93 Ill. 2d 215, 443 N.E.2d 553, 556 (1982) (attorney censured for commingling $6600 of his client’s money and using part of the funds for his personal purposes); In re Sherman, 60 Ill. 2d 590, 328 N.E.2d 553, 555 (1975) (attorney who deposited $5500 in escrow funds into his personal checking account which was
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subsequently overdrawn on several occasions censured); In re Cheronis, 114 Ill. 2d 527, 502 N.E.2d 722, 726-27 (1986) (three-month suspension where conversion was aggravated by Respondent’s serious financial condition); In re Merriwether, 138 Ill. 2d 191, 561 N.E.2d 662, 667 (1990) (three-month suspension for conversion of funds owed to lienholder where Respondent made misrepresentations to claimant); In re Bauerle, 98 SH 21, M.R. 16712 (2000) (attorney suspended for twelve months with all but four months stayed in favor of probation for conversion of $43,000 of estate funds).
Although we glean some guidance from the foregoing cases, the situation before us is not an instance where Respondent’s mere inattention to bookkeeping resulted in an unintentional use of client funds. Respondent purposely and recklessly withdrew his client’s funds from a financial institution and subjected those funds to a risk of loss. We believe the aggravating circumstances of the present case and the considerably large amount of money involved make Respondent’s misconduct inappropriate for a recommendation of a mere censure.
In fashioning a recommendation in this case, we consider the foregoing facts as well as our responsibility to safeguard the public and the reputation of the legal profession. In light of our findings regarding Respondent’s lack of dishonest motive, we do not believe that he poses a threat to his future clients. We accept his testimony that he now has a full realization of his errors and therefore we do not anticipate that a similar situation will arise again.
Nonetheless, Respondent’s actions have damaged the integrity of the profession. For this reason, and because we wish to once again alert other attorneys to the repercussions involved in the failure to properly maintain client funds, we conclude that a short suspension is warranted.
Accordingly, we recommend that Respondent Joel Alan Brodsky be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three months.
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DATED: 15 February 2002
James A. Shapiro, Chair, with Leonard J. Schrager, concurring
feistygurl // May 12, 2008 at 6:54 am
well not me chateu i wouldnt like someone inflicting daily pain on my child just to dig at my husb whos probably guilty of my demise.
chateauofdoubt // May 12, 2008 at 6:55 am
Filed August 21, 2003
IN RE JOEL ALAN BRODSKY,
Respondent-Appellee
No. 01 CH 42
Synopsis of Review Board Report and Recommendation
(August 2003)
Respondent-Appellee, Joel Alan Brodsky, was charged with conversion, failing to deposit and maintain client funds in a separate identifiable trust account, committing a criminal act, i.e. forgery, that reflects adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer, and engaging in conduct involving fraud, dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation and conduct that tends to defeat the administration of justice or bring the courts or legal profession into disrepute. Brodsky admitted most of the facts of the complaint, but denied misconduct. He alleged that he acted with intent to secure and preserve the client’s funds, not to convert them to his own use.
After a hearing, the Hearing Board concluded that Brodsky converted funds, failed to deposit client funds in a separate identifiable trust account, and engaged in conduct that tended to bring the legal profession into disrepute. The Hearing Board found, however, that Brodsky did not act with a dishonest intent, but rather intended to obtain the client’s funds in order to safeguard them against a perceived risk of imminent forfeiture to the State. The Hearing Board believed Brodsky’s testimony and noted that his demeanor was important in its determination of his credibility. Given its conclusions as to Brodsky’s intent, the Hearing Board determined that the Administrator had not proven that Brodsky committed forgery or engaged in conduct involving dishonesty. The Hearing Board recommended that Brodsky be suspended for three months.
The case was before the Review Board on the Administrator’s exceptions. The Administrator objected to the Hearing Board’s failure to find that Brodsky committed forgery or engaged in dishonest conduct and its recommendation as to discipline. Brodsky sought a lesser sanction, such as censure.
The Review Board affirmed the Hearing Board’s findings as to the charges of misconduct. The Review Board relied on the applicable standard of review and the deference given to the Hearing Board’s determinations on factual issues, particularly witness credibility.
The Review Board also upheld the Hearing Board’s sanction recommendation. The Review Board agreed with the Hearing Board that the seriousness of Brodsky’s misconduct and the amount of client funds involved merited suspension, but a short suspension was warranted, given the lack of dishonest intent and the other mitigating factors present.
Filed August 21, 2003
BEFORE THE REVIEW BOARD
OF THE
ILLINOIS ATTORNEY REGISTRATION
AND
DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION
In the Matter of:
JOEL ALAN BRODSKY,
Respondent-Appellee,
No. 6182556.
Commission No. 01 CH 42
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE REVIEW BOARD
The Administrator-Appellant charged Respondent-Appellee, Joel Alan Brodsky, with misconduct concerning an account belonging to a decedent’s estate. The one-count complaint charged Brodsky with conversion, failing to deposit and maintain client funds in a separate identifiable trust account in violation of Rules 1.15(a) and 1.15(d) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (188 Ill. 2d Rd. 1.15(a), 1.15(d)); committing a criminal act, specifically forgery, that reflects adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in violation of Rule 8.4(a)(3) (188 Ill. 2d R. 8.4(a)(3); and engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in violation of Rule 8.4(a)(4) (188 Ill. 2d R. 8.4(a)(4)) and conduct that tends to defeat the administration of justice or bring the courts or legal profession into disrepute in violation of Supreme Court Rule 771 (134 Ill. 2d R. 771). FN1
Brodsky admitted most of the facts alleged in the complaint, but denied misconduct. He argues that he acted with the intent to secure and preserve the estate’s funds, not to convert them to his own use.
The Hearing Board found that the Administrator proved some, but not all, of the misconduct charged. Specifically, the Hearing Board found that Brodsky converted funds, failed to deposit client funds in a separate identifiable trust account, and engaged in conduct that tended
PAGE 2:
to bring the legal profession into disrepute. The Hearing Board found that the Administrator did not prove that Brodsky violated Rules 8.4(a)(3) or 8.4(a)(4) by committing the crime of forgery or engaging in conduct involving dishonesty. The Hearing Board recommended that Brodsky be suspended for three months.
The case is before the Review Board on the Administrator’s exceptions. The Administrator challenges the Hearing Board’s failure to find violations of Rules 8.4(a)(3) or 8.4(a)(4). Both parties challenge the sanction recommendation.
The Hearing Board’s report and recommendation describes the facts in detail. The facts are summarized here only as needed to understand this opinion.
Brodsky, a sole practitioner, has been licensed to practice law in Illinois since 1982. He has no prior discipline. Brodsky presented favorable character evidence.
From January 1989 until April 1997, Brodsky was in partnership with Bahtiar Hoxha. Hoxha handled all matters relating to estates and probate cases. When the partnership ended, Brodsky and Hoxha were not on speaking terms. Hoxha took all the probate files with him.
During the partnership, Hoxha represented the Estate of Charroon Shotivattana, deceased. On March 1, 1990, the estate administrator, Herbert Shoichi Tomita, opened a bank account for the estate. Tomita was the sole signatory on the account.
Unbeknownst to Brodsky, Tomita died in April 1995.
On or about July 19, 2000, Brodsky received a letter from the bank, addressed to Tomita, in care of Brodsky & Hoxha. The letter stated that the estate account, which had been inactive since January 1995, had been reclassified as dormant. The letter stated that the account could be restored to active status by making a deposit or signing an accompanying reactivation
PAGE 3:
request form.
Absent a response to the letter, the account funds would have been turned over to the State. Brodsky incorrectly believed that the funds could be forfeited within days or a week.
Brodsky claims he did not contact Hoxha, because he assumed that Hoxha had neglected the estate and would not properly complete the work. Instead, Brodsky signed the reactivation request, in his own name, and took it to the bank. The bank rejected the request because Brodsky was not a signatory on the account. Brodsky did not think of making a deposit to the account.
After checking the court file and learning that there had been no activity for at least five years, Brodsky decided to submit a second reactivation form. Brodsky signed Tomita’s name to the form, attempting to make the signature appear like Tomita’s. Brodsky delivered this form to the bank, on July 20, 2000. The bank accepted the signature and reactivated the account.
While at the bank, Brodsky asked that the account be closed. A banker, Victor Zezelic, told Brodsky that he needed a signed direction from Tomita, to do so.
Brodsky returned to the bank with a handwritten note, asking that the account be closed. There was conflicting testimony as to when this occurred. The note purported to be from Tomita; in fact, Brodsky prepared the note. On June 23, 2000, Zezelic closed the account and gave Brodsky a cashier’s check for $23,012.91, the account proceeds. The check was made payable to Tomita, as administrator of the estate.
Brodsky wanted the bank to believe that the signatures were Tomita’s, but he testified that the purpose behind his actions was to get the money out of the account, in order to avoid having it forfeited to the State.
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Brodsky did not have express permission from anyone for his actions. He believed, however, that he had implied authority, because he was one of the attorneys of record for the estate in the probate proceeding. Brodsky acknowledged that he since had learned that his belief was incorrect.
After picking up the cashier’s check, Brodsky attempted to find Tomita, without success. He then endorsed the check, in Tomita’s name. At Brodsky’s request, a friend gave him cash in return for the check. This occurred the same day that Brodsky received the check.
Brodsky placed the cash in a safe in his home, testifying again that his purpose in doing so was to protect the funds. Brodsky testified that he kept the funds in cash because he could not open an account in Tomita’s name without Tomita’s signature and could not place the funds in his own account because to do so would constitute commingling. Brodsky believed that he could not put the funds in his client trust account because the funds were from a probate estate and such funds could not be commingled with other client accounts.
Brodsky did not seek advice from a probate attorney at that time. He testified that he intended to find Tomita and take Tomita and the money to a probate attorney to complete the matter.
The cash remained in Brodsky’s safe between July 2000 and November 2000. Brodsky testified that, because he was extremely busy during that time, he did not have an opportunity to follow up regarding the funds. Brodsky was not in any financial trouble during that period and did not use any of the estate’s money.
In early November 2000, Brodsky and Zezelic each received letters from Hoxha, notifying them of Tomita’s death. Hoxha demanded that the bank replenish the funds. Upon Zezelic’s request, Brodsky promptly returned, to the bank, the full amount of cash he had
PAGE 5:
received.
Zezelic believed Brodsky had made a mistake and had not acted with any dishonest motive.
Brodsky testified that his judgment was affected by his opinion of Hoxha. He expressed remorse and recognized that he had handled the matter incorrectly.
In a disciplinary proceeding, the Administrator has the burden of proving the misconduct charged, by clear and convincing evidence. In re Ingersoll, 186 Ill. 2d 163, 168, 710 N.E.2d 390, 237 Ill. Dec. 760 (1999). While less stringent than the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the clear and convincing evidence standard requires more than a simple preponderance of the evidence. Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 647 N.E.2d 273, 207 Ill. Dec. 311, 314 (1995); People v. Williams, 143 Ill. 2d 477, 484, 577 N.E.2d 762, 160 Ill. Dec. 437 (1990). Clear and convincing evidence means a degree of proof that, in light of all the evidence, produces a firm and abiding belief that it is highly probable that the proposition at issue is true. Cleary & Graham, Handbook of Illinois Evidence, ?301.6 (7th ed. 1999). Clear and convincing evidence requires a high level of certainty. In re Stephenson, 67 Ill. 2d 544, 556, 367 N.E.2d 1273, 10 Ill. Dec. 507 (1977). This standard of proof is not one in which the risk of error is allocated equally between the parties, but rather one that requires a greater level of proof, qualitatively and quantitatively, from the Administrator. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 764-66, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1400-01, 71 L.Ed. 2d 599 (1982). The record must be free from doubt, and the Administrator’s burden is not met merely by proof of suspicious circumstances. In re Donaghy, 402 Ill. 120, 83 N.E.2d 560 (1948); In re Mitgang, 385 Ill. 311, 52 N.E. 2d 807, 813 (1944).
The Hearing Board’s report demonstrates that it weighed the evidence in light of
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this standard of proof. Based on its analysis of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses, and after thorough consideration of the evidence, the Hearing Board concluded that, while he engaged in misconduct, Brodsky did not have a dishonest motive and lacked the necessary intent for the crime of forgery.
The Review Board reviews such factual findings deferentially. The Hearing Board’s factual findings are to be affirmed unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Spak, 188 Ill. 2d 53, 66, 719 N.E.2d 747, 241 Ill. Dec. 618 (1999). This standard of review does not permit the Review Board to reverse simply because another conclusion is possible, or because the Review Board might have reached a different conclusion if it had been called upon to find the facts in the first instance. Bazydlo, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 647 N.E.2d 273, 207 Ill. Dec. at 314-15. Rather, a finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or the fact found appears unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence. Leonardi v. Loyola University, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 106, 658 N.E.2d 450, 212 Ill. Dec. 968 (1995).
The Hearing Board believed Brodsky’s testimony and referred to its observations of Brodsky while testifying. The Hearing Board’s findings regarding the credibility of witnesses and the resolution of conflicting testimony in particular deserve great deference because the Hearing Board can observe the witnesses’ demeanor and assess their credibility. Spak, 188 Ill. 2d at 66, 719 N.E.2d 747, 241 Ill. Dec. 618.
The Hearing Board expressly found that a key element of forgery, intent to defraud, was missing. The Hearing Board believed Brodsky’s testimony that his intent was to secure and protect estate funds for their lawful owner, against a perceived risk of forfeiture. The Hearing Board also accepted Brodsky’s testimony that he believed that he had to act quickly to
PAGE 7:
protect the estate funds from forfeiture and that his attempt to mimic Tomita’s signature was predicated on this belief.
While noting that Brodsky admitted signing Tomita’s name, three separate times, the Hearing Board credited Brodsky’s testimony that his intent in doing so was not to defraud the bank or his client or to misappropriate estate funds. While Brodsky signed Tomita’s name to documents, the Hearing Board found that, in doing so, he did not intend to defraud the owner of the money and was not acting out of any improper purpose. FN2 These are significant considerations in analyzing evidence of alleged forgery. See In re Johnson, 133 Ill. 2d 516, 528-29, 552 N.E.2d 703, 142 Ill. Dec. 112 (1989).
The Hearing Board also observed that Brodsky:
“repeatedly stated that he was worried about the imminent forfeiture of the funds ? and wanted to act quickly to protect those funds on behalf of his client. Moreover, he believed that, as attorney of record for the Shotivattana estate, he had the authority to sign Tomita’s name to release the estate funds. His actions, as he came to learn at a later time, were fraught with mistaken assumptions. While we clearly do not excuse Respondent for his failure to investigate his authority to sign another person’s name or his lack of thoroughness in researching the law applicable to dormant accounts, his misguided actions and lack of research alone are not sufficient to establish an intent to defraud.”
The Hearing Board declined to infer fraudulent intent from the other circumstances of the case.
The Hearing Board expressly found that Brodsky did not act with an intent to defraud the bank or the estate. Thus, contrary to the Administrator’s position, the Hearing Board did make a factual finding on the issue of intent to defraud the bank.
The Administrator contends that the undisputed facts establish intent to defraud as a matter of law. Unlike its factual findings, the Hearing Board’s legal conclusions are reviewed
PAGE 8:
de novo. In re Discipio, 163 Ill. 2d 515, 527, 645 N.E. 2d 906, 206 Ill. Dec. 654 (1991).
Intent to defraud is an essential element of the crime of forgery. 720 ILCS 5/17-3 (2002); People v. Bailey, 15 Ill. 2d 18, 23, 153 N.E.2d 584 (1958). Based on the facts presented, the Hearing Board might have found, or presumed, intent to defraud. See generally People v. Muzzarelli, 331 Ill. App. 3d 118, 121-22, 770 N.E.2d 1232, 264 Ill. Dec. 536 (3d Dist. 2002); People v. Gawlak, 276 Ill. App. 3d 286, 657 N.E.2d 1057, 212 Ill. Dec. 712 (1st Dist. 1995); People v. Carr, 225 Ill. App. 3d 170, 176, 587 N.E.2d 543, 167 Ill. Dec. 274 (1st Dist. 1992); 720 ILCS 5/17-3(b) (2002).
Issues of intent, however, are issues of fact. See e.g. Spak, 188 Ill. 2d at 66, 719 N.E.2d 747, 241 Ill. Dec. 618; Bailey, 15 Ill. 2d at 20, 153 N.E.2d 584. Any presumption of intent arising from circumstances such as the signing of another’s name on a document is rebuttable. See People v. Bokuniewicz, 160 Ill. App. 3d 270, 273-74, 513 N.E.2d 138, 111 Ill. Dec. 892 (2d Dist. 1987). Whether or not the circumstances of any given case show fraudulent intent is a matter for the Hearing Board. Compare Spak, 188 Ill. 2d at 66, 719 N.E.2d 747, 241 Ill. Dec. 618; In re Stern, 124 Ill.2d 310, 315, 529 N.E.2d 562, 124 Ill. Dec. 581 (1988).
The cases on which the Administrator relies are all criminal cases in which the trier of fact found that intent was proven. See e.g. Bokuniewicz, 160 Ill. App. 3d 270, 513 N.E.2d 138, 111 Ill. Dec. 892; People v. Hackbert, 13 Ill. App. 3d 427, 300 N.E.2d 777 (2d Dist. 1973); People v. Merchant, 5 Ill. App. 3d 636, 283 N.E.2d 724 (5th Dist. 1972).
This factor cannot be ignored. In a criminal appeal, the convicted defendant has a very heavy burden of persuasion. The standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence is very deferential, i.e. whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
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reasonable doubt. See People v. Kunce, 196 Ill. App. 3d 388, 391, 553 N.E.2d 799, 143 Ill. Dec. 92 (3d Dist. 1990).
Thus, criminal cases in which a conviction is upheld show only that, in a case in which the trier of fact found intent to defraud, the evidence was sufficient to support that determination. See Kunce, 196 Ill. App. 3d at 391, 553 N.E.2d 799, 143 Ill. Dec. 92. Such cases do not demonstrate that the trier of fact in this case erred, as a matter of law, in concluding that intent to defraud was not proven.
The Hearing Board based its conclusion that Brodsky did not engage in conduct involving dishonesty on similar reasons. The Hearing Board observed that Brodsky acted in haste, without seeking appropriate information or advice, and that his decision-making was clouded by the ill-will between himself and Hoxha. As the Hearing Board legitimately found that Brodsky did not commit forgery, it also legitimately found that he did not engage in conduct involving dishonesty. See Johnson, 133 Ill. 2d at 529, 552 N.E.2d 703, 142 Ill. Dec. 112.
The facts here might have permitted a different result. They do not, however, compel an opposite result. The Hearing Board, as the trier of fact, determined that Brodsky acted without an intent to defraud and did not commit the crime of forgery. This is a determination within the province of the Hearing Board, as trier of fact, and its findings are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
The remaining issue concerns the Hearing Board’s recommendation of a three-month suspension.
The Hearing Board’s recommendation as to discipline is advisory and does not bind the Review Board; however, it can provide guidance for determining the appropriate sanction. Ingersoll, 186 Ill. 2d 163, 178, 710 N.E.2d 390, 237 Ill. Dec. 760.
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The Administrator seeks a longer suspension. Brodsky suggests that a censure would suffice.
The purpose of discipline is not to punish the respondent, but to protect the public, maintain the integrity of the profession, and protect the administration of justice from reproach. In re Timpone, 157 Ill. 2d 178, 197, 623 N.E.2d 300, 191 Ill. Dec. 55 (1993). Predictability and fairness require consistency in the sanctions imposed for similar misconduct; however, each case must be resolved on its own unique facts and circumstances. Ingersoll, 186 Ill. 2d at 177-78, 710 N.E.2d 390, 237 Ill. Dec. 760.
Brodsky converted substantial client funds. As the Hearing Board observed, by doing so, Brodsky exposed the client to a substantial risk of loss. Further, Brodsky’s actions were purposeful, rather than the result of sloppy bookkeeping. These factors support the recommendation of a suspension, rather than censure. Compare In re Young, 111 Ill. 2d 98, 488 N.E.2d 1014, 94 Ill. Dec. 767 (1986); In re Mayster, No. 99 CH 59 (Review Board Dec. 28, 2001), petition for leave to file exceptions denied, No. M.R. 18008 (May 24, 2002).
Brodsky, however, acted without a dishonest motive. This is an important mitigating factor. Spak, 188 Ill. 2d at 68-69, 719 N.E.2d 747, 241 Ill. Dec. 618. The lack of any dishonest motive, and the finding that Brodsky did not engage in forgery or dishonest conduct, distinguish this case from the cases on which the Administrator relies in seeking a longer suspension. Compare e.g. In re Turner, 75 Ill. 2d 128, 387 N.E.2d 282, 25 Ill. Dec. 626 (1979); In re Garside, No. 98 CH 105 (Hearing Board March 27, 2001), motion to approve and confirm denied, No. M.R. 17527 (June 29, 2001); see also In re Passman, , No. 93 CH 573 (Review Board Dec. 27, 1995), approved and confirmed, No. M.R. 12249 (March 26, 1996). Less severe discipline is generally imposed where the respondent has not acted with a dishonest purpose or
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for personal gain. See e.g. In re Levy, 115 Ill. 2d 395, 504 N.E.2d 107, 105 Ill. Dec. 238 (1987).
The existence of a bona fide legal concern in the matter in which the respondent acted is another mitigating factor. See Young, 111 Ill. 2d at 105, 488 N.E.2d 1014, 94 Ill. Dec. 767. Additionally, Brodsky promptly returned the funds, before any complaint was filed with the ARDC. He expressed remorse and fully recognized his misconduct. Brodsky also presented favorable character evidence, engaged in pro bono and charitable activities, and has no prior discipline.
Given all the circumstances, we concur in the Hearing Board’s recommendation of a three-month suspension.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Hearing Board’s findings of fact and findings as to the misconduct charged and recommend that Respondent-Appellee, Joel Alan Brodsky, be suspended for three months.
Respectfully submitted,
Leonard F. Amari
James E. Caldwell
Kevin M. Forde
Dated: 21 August 2003
FN1: Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to Rules are to the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct.
FN2: We do not imply that Brodsky was authorized to sign on behalf of Tomita; attorneys do not have such blanket authority. See Johnson, 133 Ill. 2d at 527-28, 552 N.E.2d 703, 142 Ill. Dec. 112; In re Walner, 119 Ill. 2d 511, 524-25, 519 N.E.2d 903, 116 Ill. Dec. 688 (1988).
facsmiley // May 12, 2008 at 6:55 am
Out of the thousands of people who have donated money to the organization, seems like there are about five who are very concerned about the tax status of the money they gave.
Meanwhile, there’s a murder and a missing woman. I can tell you which is the more compelling case to me.
It’s hard to understand why those people with the beef about the tax status can’t see how their obsession with this (non?)issue comes off looking either like sour grapes or an attempt to detract from the real issue.
Yes, you few people are vey concerned about the $20 you donated. We get it. The rest of us are very concerned over what happened to the dead woman and the missing woman.
Please, by all means pursue your investigation through any civil and legal means available to you, but accept that most people don’t share your concerns and are not going to rally around you.
chateauofdoubt // May 12, 2008 at 6:55 am
DECISION FROM DISCIPLINARY REPORTS AND DECISIONS SEARCH
M.R. 19007 - In re: Joel Alan Brodsky. Disciplinary Commission.
The petition by the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission for leave to file exceptions to the report and recommendation of the Review Board is denied. Respondent Joel Alan Brodsky is suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months, as recommended by the Review Board.
Respondent Joel Alan Brodsky shall reimburse the Disciplinary Fund for any Client Protection payments arising from his conduct prior to the termination of the period of suspension.
Order entered by the Court.
chateauofdoubt // May 12, 2008 at 6:56 am
DECISION FROM DISCIPLINARY REPORTS AND DECISIONS SEARCH
M.R. 19007 - In re: Joel Alan Brodsky (January 20, 2004)
Disciplinary Commission.
The petition by the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission for leave to file exceptions to the report and recommendation of the Review Board is denied. Respondent Joel Alan Brodsky is suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months, as recommended by the Review Board.
Respondent Joel Alan Brodsky shall reimburse the Disciplinary Fund for any Client Protection payments arising from his conduct prior to the termination of the period of suspension.
Order entered by the Court.
facsmiley // May 12, 2008 at 6:58 am
Chateau, could you maybe just link this stuff?
feistygurl // May 12, 2008 at 7:00 am
well i could care less but when they outright lie about getting the number when you hit the donate. have any of you seen the number? no cuz there isnt one. i dont care if ya gave $10 or a million its wrong. but dont ask cuz u will go to hell. yeah right. oh i think you are wrong about not many concerned have ya looked at fsp stats lately. & i also think alot of donators arent to thrilled about paying for some1 to come from ca for a funraiser
chateauofdoubt // May 12, 2008 at 7:00 am
www . iardc . org
& look up Joel Brodsky - sorry, the links will not post.
It would appear that according to the above disciplinary actions, Mr. Brodsky had difficulties in handling funds before.
amandareckonwith // May 12, 2008 at 7:02 am
chateau, please stop posting such long articles, just give the synopsis.
That is beyond annoying.
chateauofdoubt // May 12, 2008 at 7:02 am
I am more concerned about an attorney lying myself.
feistygurl // May 12, 2008 at 7:03 am
brodsky aint pimping for money
chateauofdoubt // May 12, 2008 at 7:04 am
Just want to post the proof, as in the facts. Public record as it were.
Posts that are annoying are subjective.
chateauofdoubt // May 12, 2008 at 7:04 am
Oh but he did pimp for money.
Brodsky claimed that their site received over 1 million hits and that there had reached their goal.
amandareckonwith // May 12, 2008 at 7:05 am
According to the news story yesterday, they bought a boat. Why did they not just use the boats people have?
(add the “h”):
ttp://tinypic.com/player.php?v=rc52xx&s=3
amandareckonwith // May 12, 2008 at 7:06 am
chateau, that was in Dec, iirc. It was down the first day, so therefore, a moot point.
feistygurl // May 12, 2008 at 7:06 am
ya but you just filled the whole page. * i still dont get why you think he should get another lawyer
chateauofdoubt // May 12, 2008 at 7:07 am
That’s old news Amanda, where have you been? You should try reading the news a little more often and check the CBS archives where Sharon stated that on an interview probably over 2 weeks ago.
feistygurl // May 12, 2008 at 7:07 am
& you believe he got money from that? who would donate
chateauofdoubt // May 12, 2008 at 7:08 am
I don’t know what to believe, so why not investigate it?
feistygurl // May 12, 2008 at 7:09 am
anyone know when the next search is there is no postings that i can find. will it be after the girl in ca goes home?
chateauofdoubt // May 12, 2008 at 7:09 am
Oh I don’t think he should get another lawyer, I think the lawyer who casting out accusations should be subject to the same scrutiny.
chateauofdoubt // May 12, 2008 at 7:11 am
If the website was up, with one million hits, one could only guess how much money was raised.
It should not matter if it was a day or a minute, if Defend Drew website was asking for public funds, they had better also be licensed to do so.
feistygurl // May 12, 2008 at 7:12 am
so your a tit for tat kinda person? wrong is wrong it doesnt matter who is more wrong.
feistygurl // May 12, 2008 at 7:14 am
did you donate to it?
feistygurl // May 12, 2008 at 7:15 am
were you told youd go to hell if ya asked about your donation
cfs7360 // May 12, 2008 at 7:16 am
feistygurl, on May 12th, 2008 at 7:15 am Said:
were you told youd go to hell if ya asked about your donation
_____________________________________
Were you?
chateauofdoubt // May 12, 2008 at 7:18 am
I just feel that since one is being called on the carpet, so too should the other.
Or do we just let Drew and Brodsky slide on that one?
feistygurl // May 12, 2008 at 7:18 am
not i personnaly but i read it want me to go get ya the quote where the person who asked that was told just that?
cfs7360 // May 12, 2008 at 7:20 am
chateauofdoubt, on May 12th, 2008 at 7:18 am Said:
I just feel that since one is being called on the carpet, so too should the other.
Or do we just let Drew and Brodsky slide on that one?
_________________________________________
Chateau, I’ve brought that up before as well. Nothing has ever been said to substantiate any amount collected, except what Brodsky said about meeting their short term goal, so who knows?
feistygurl // May 12, 2008 at 7:20 am
i cant stand dp or brodsky. i just think sp deserves much more than she is getting from there. & so do her children that noone over there ever seems to think about.
chateauofdoubt // May 12, 2008 at 7:22 am
Exactly CFS7360, nobody is questioning an attorney with documented track record (refer to my annoyingly long post of facts above) of mismanaging funds for a client.
amandareckonwith // May 12, 2008 at 7:23 am
chateau, anyone can ask for money. It isn’t illegal at all. You just have to pay taxes on it.
The purpose of tax-exempt is so that the donators as well as the recipient both win. See?
Under the guise of tax-exempt, they raised funds. Let’s just say I tried to write it off for 2007. Now I would have to file an extension, or forego the deduction. It is important for lots of people whether you like it or not.
Not to mention someone at FoSP is going to have to pay taxes on the fund if they linked that to their ssn. The false number on the first funraiser posters may be someone’s ssn.
cfs7360 // May 12, 2008 at 7:23 am
feistygurl, on May 12th, 2008 at 7:18 am Said:
not i personnaly but i read it want me to go get ya the quote where the person who asked that was told just that?
_______________________________________
No thanks. Not if you have to post it from FSP. If it wasn’t you, then why be concerned about it? Let whoever that person is deal with it.
chateauofdoubt // May 12, 2008 at 7:24 am
Well, what do I do about the guy I hand cash off to on the street with a sign? He never gives me a receipt.
What should I do about that guy?
feistygurl // May 12, 2008 at 7:25 am
maybe you should read up on childhood trauma. might learn a few things.
amandareckonwith // May 12, 2008 at 7:27 am
For the record, I think Drew did it, I think Brodsky is not a very good lawyer, just in this for fame.
So there you have it.
That said, I question the fund, the searches, the whole mess circus they have made in Stacy Peterson’s name.
feistygurl // May 12, 2008 at 7:28 am
well its there for everyone to read. as far as the guy on the street you probably just bought him a 12 pack
lavandadolce // May 12, 2008 at 7:28 am
facsmiley, on May 12th, 2008 at 6:55 am Said:
Out of the thousands of people who have donated money to the organization, seems like there are about five who are very concerned about the tax status of the money they gave.
Meanwhile, there’s a murder and a missing woman. I can tell you which is the more compelling case to me.
It’s hard to understand why those people with the beef about the tax status can’t see how their obsession with this (non?)issue comes off looking either like sour grapes or an attempt to detract from the real issue.
Yes, you few people are vey concerned about the $20 you donated. We get it. The rest of us are very concerned over what happened to the dead woman and the missing woman.
Please, by all means pursue your investigation through any civil and legal means available to you, but accept that most people don’t share your concerns and are not going to rally around you.
_______________________
_______________________
Facsmiley, it’s not about “how some people may have donated $20. ” You know that everyone, including those who are questioning this fund, is VERY concerned over Stacy and the search for her. It’s about possible mismanagement of the funds….and it is certainly about MISLEADING what the donation page stated the money would go towards.
However, I will tell you that I also believe something is amiss with HOW the funds are distributed and WHAT the funds are going towards. According to FSP’s website, this is what they say the money is for: (the spelling error is how it is presented in the FSP Donation link)
*Donations received will be use to pay the exspenses of the search efforts to find Stacy. Donations will cover the cost of the equipment that is used, fuel for the equipment used and lodging as needed for the search teams. Thank you for your support!*
Some of us donated much more than $20.00. My actual monetary donations from the raffle tickets, entry, SP items, Printing costs (I made cards that were distributed in Bolingbrook), & Silent Auction, was well over $300.00. Additionally, I spent over $600 out of my own pocket for an airfare to Chicago, hotel and meals. (not considered donations, of course) So yes. I have had a vested interest in the FSP Fund and how my money was managed. I was led to believe the quote above. All I know is that I feel used. I’ve already decided I will NEVER make another donation to any other “worthy” cause unless it is about somebody I personally know.
You may diss this off as “disgruntled folks”, however, I know many people who are whacking that donate button are not in the financial position to donate even the $20 that you stated…and it really troubles me to learn that money has been spent to fly a Julie In CA to Chicago, and possibly to Bolingbrook on Mothers Day…spent on sending volunteers to hotel rooms, meals, and other out of the city expenses, and who knows what “beverages” were purchased with Find Stacy funds…to get a certification in searching…YET…WHERE ARE THE SEARCHES?
You mentioned the car dealership and the money they invested. Well, that was a new investment. I don’t think the car dealership themselves would approve to know that money was spent by a bunch of 25 year olds to party it up on these “events” the night before and the day of. It’s not necessary for them to have gotten hotel rooms out of the city. Sorry. One could have driven home the same day. We are talking a few hours drive. You tell me what company would authorize their employees to invest in hotel stays with a couple hours of driving? Let alone hotel stays that were RIGHT in the surrounding town of Bolingbrook? What gives? Most companies do not allow hotel expenses nor meals unless a minimum of 3.5 hour drive to ones destination.
So yes. I question all of it. As well as anyone else who has seen that professional search teams were turned away. YES…there is proof of that. YES there is proof that a dog team was also turned away. ALL we ask is WHY????
Why can other missing loved ones conduct searches WITHOUT all this kind of money involved and DO MORE searching? I didn’t see a fundraiser club for Laci Peterson? I didn’t see wine parties in hotel rooms? We’re all on the same side…however, I know personally some of those that have donated money are being felt like they were pressured and didn’t have the money. And guess who does the pressuring? Who do you see in FSP that constant was posting “hit the donate” button over and over again…as she stated she wasn’t going to the Fundraiser and then shows up …not once, but twice? Julie in CA. Well, as the spokesperson (a spokesperson, who by the way does not allow her photograph to be published, yet appeared on every media video with only her first name posted…that’s not shady in itself? Why? Why does she not want her name in the media and only goes by “Julie”….and yet is deemed a “spokesperson” in the FSP fund to authorize her flight paid out of the “search for Stacy” fund?
I sure hope she is ready to go in front of whatever committee investigates her encouragement of folks to hit the donate button so that she could spend time smooching up with the Adm of FSP while HE authorized her payment to the Friends of Stacy Committee for her attendance. Last I knew nobody is going to find Stacy in the corner of a hotel room surrounded by bottles of wine. Eh?
cfs7360 // May 12, 2008 at 7:32 am
feistygurl, on May 12th, 2008 at 7:25 am Said:
maybe you should read up on childhood trauma. might learn a few things.
________________________________________
Not sure who this was directed to, but if it was me, I am a psychology major so I am well aware of the effects of “childhood trauma.”
lavandadolce // May 12, 2008 at 7:33 am
chateauofdoubt, on May 12th, 2008 at 7:24 am Said:
Well, what do I do about the guy I hand cash off to on the street with a sign? He never gives me a receipt.
What should I do about that guy?
______________________
That “guy” is not deceiving you. You know where that money is going…or at least have a good idea. The FSP has deceived people. You go look yourself. Go and read the DONATION link at the site. Read what they say your donations are going for.
Where does it say they are using the money to fund hotel rooms, meals and flights for bloggers? Where does it say they will use that money to send a crew out of town for hotel, meals and what have you when they could have easily car pooled it and came home the same night? It’s one giant party crew running that entire fundraiser and headed up with the encouragment of the Anthony and Julie in CA.
(who of course I understand are “in it” together.)
All I can say is that KERRY, SHARON, and CAROL need to get a real grip on what is going on. Perhaps they would know more if they REALLY paid attention to what is going on the nights before the events …and the nights of the events. THEN tell me that money was used for searching for Stacy. Stacy is not in a hotel room chugging down the wine. But they are.
feistygurl // May 12, 2008 at 7:34 am
yr before last my family bought 3 $100 dollar tickets to the st jude dreamhouse giveaway. now that is 300 dollars that we scraped for cuz its a charity we all believe in (having a nephew who passed away from leukemia when he was 12. ) so it did help that we could tax deduct it. lots of ppl dont have extra money that they can just give away. now if st jude had lied to us i wouldnt donate to them again. now with that post saying the hell thing & the lie that you would get the number when you hit the donate button how many ppl do ya think they have seen it as i lie & just dont donate cuz of it. i would think lots
amandareckonwith // May 12, 2008 at 7:35 am
I donated a tad more than $20. I did plan to write it off, but now I just consider it a waste of my money.
I also gave a week to search and help.
So, you can shove that whaaaaa about $20.
Besides, $20 is PRECIOUS to a person on a limited income, so don’t disrespect the size of the donation.
chateauofdoubt // May 12, 2008 at 7:37 am
I feel like since this is not an endeavor untaken by a group of professionals, there are probably some learning experiences as they proceed. It’s not every day a loved one goes missing.
I think they are doing the best they know how under the circumstances.
amandareckonwith // May 12, 2008 at 7:37 am
Oh, and lavanda is generous and sweet to use the word “misleading”.
I say it worse. I say “LIARS”.
I am right at the teetering point of saying CHEATERS, because I really do have hope that they will do the right thing and disclose.
That is, unless they need more time to cook the books.
chateauofdoubt // May 12, 2008 at 7:40 am
How exactly did you deduct that $300?
I deducted all of my charitable commitments without the need of a tax #.
lavandadolce // May 12, 2008 at 7:41 am
chateauofdoubt, on May 12th, 2008 at 7:37 am Said:
I feel like since this is not an endeavor untaken by a group of professionals, there are probably some learning experiences as they proceed. It’s not every day a loved one goes missing.
I think they are doing the best they know how under the circumstances.
__________________________
Funding an online love affair IS NOT DOING the best under the circumstances. Sorry to be so blunt…but that is what it comes down to. NOR is drinking parties. Even my 13 year old could manage a fund better than t